Lands and Natural Resources by Wilcox, Ronald L.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 60 
Issue 2 Tenth Circuit Surveys Article 14 
February 2021 
Lands and Natural Resources 
Ronald L. Wilcox 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Ronald L. Wilcox, Lands and Natural Resources, 60 Denv. L.J. 333 (1982). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
INTRODUCTION
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a wide variety of cases
dealing with public lands and natural resources during the period covered
by this survey. The decisions reflect a changing environment for the natural
resource practitioner, for it is clear that public land and natural resource law
is no longer relegated to the confines of property law. Nearly all of the
Tenth Circuit decisions involve statutory and regulatory schemes embodying
both economic and social significance. Perhaps no other opinion highlighted
the significance of these policies as well as the court's consideration of fa-
vored nations clauses in natural gas sales contracts.
I. OIL AND GAS
A. Favored Nations Clauses
Among the common features of natural gas sale and purchase contracts
are escalation clauses, which provide for increases in the price of gas
purchased and sold upon the happening of a specified event.I Escalation
clauses generally fall within the category of two-party favored nations
clauses, in which the buyer agrees to increase the price paid to the seller to
match any higher price paid by the buyer to other sellers in the same field or
area, 2 or third-party favored nations clauses, in which the buyer agrees to
increase the price paid to the seller to match any higher price paid by any
other buyer in the same field or area. 3 The Tenth Circuit, in a diversity
1. 4 H. WILLIAMS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 726, at 748.4 (1981).
2. Examples of two-party favored nations clauses may be found in Arkansas Louisiana
Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571 (1981); Superior Oil Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co., 604 F.2d 1281
(10th Cir. 1979); Eastern Petroleum Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 447 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1971);
Lone Star Gas Co. v. Howard Corp., 556 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977),errorretf'dn.r.e., 568
S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1978).
3. The difference between a two-party and third-party favored nations clause is explained
in Lone Star Gas Co. v. Howard Corp., 556 S.W.2d 372 ('ex. Civ. App. 1977): "A three-party
favored nations clause enables a vendor to receive the benefit of a higher than contract price
paid by any purchaser. A two-party favored nations clause restricts the vendor to the benefit of
higher than contract price paid by his contract purchaser." Id. at 374 (emphasis in original).
An example of a third-party favored nations clause may be found in Louisiana-Nevada
Transit Co. v. Woods, 393 F. Supp. 177 (W.D. Ark. 1975). Favored nations clauses that are
triggered by price increases initiated by government agencies may also be a form of third-party
favored nations clauses. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 505 F. Supp. 628 (D.
Kan. 1980); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 612 P.2d 463 (Wyo. 1980); see Energy
Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 230 Kan. 176, 630 P.2d 1142 (1981) a 'd, 103 S.
Ct. 697 (1983); Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 229 Kan. 631, 629 P.2d 190
(1981), cert. denited, 455 U.S. 928 (1982); Tuthill v. Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 614 S.W.2d 205
(Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
Clauses that tie price increases to the highest price allowed by government regulation are
also referred to as area rate clauses:
An area rate clause is a price escalation provision in a natural gas purchase and
sales contract between a producer and interstate pipeline. It authorizes an escalation
in the contract price whenever there is an increase in the applicable just and reason-
able wellhead ceiling price for the category of gas involved.
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action arising in Wyoming, upheld such a third-party favored nations clause
in Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern Utilities, Inc. 4 against a three-pronged attack in
which the clause was asserted to be contrary to federal policy under the Nat-
ural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA),5 violative of Wyoming law regarding
public policy, and unconscionable. Challenges to favored nations clauses in
gas sales contracts are not new; however, the challenge in Kerr-McGee Corp. is
among the first of its kind in many years. Although restricted to Wyoming
law,6 the Tenth Circuit's diversity holding suggests that favored nations
clauses may be ripe for similar challenges in other states.
In 1957 and 1958 Northern Utilities, Inc. entered into agreements with
Kerr-McGee Corporation, Phillips Petroleum Co., and a predecessor in in-
terest of Amoco Production Co. to purchase natural gas from the Beaver
Creek Field in Fremont County, Wyoming. The contracts obligated North-
ern Utilities, an intrastate public utility regulated by the Wyoming Public
Service Commission, to purchase natural gas from the three producers for a
period of twenty years. Each of the original contracts contained a two-party
favored nations clause whereby Northern Utilities agreed to pay the three
producers as high a price as Northern Utilities paid other producers in Wyo-
ming for gas.
7
In April 1970, Amoco, acting as unit operator of the Beaver Creek
Field,8 notified Northern Utilities of the availability of excess gas from the
Beaver Creek Field. On October 1, 1970, Amoco and Northern Utilities en-
tered into a supplemental agreement extending the original 1957 contract to
December 31, 1990. The supplemental agreement, while retaining the origi-
nal two-party favored nations clause, added a new paragraph, 6(b), which
called for an increase in the contract price whenever any producer in Wyo-
ming received a higher price for the sale of interstate gas.9 Phillips and Kerr-
Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 645 F.2d 360, 365 n.l (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982).
A number of other escalation clauses may be found in 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND
GAS LAW MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 242 (1981).
4. 673 F.2d 323 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 344 (1982).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (Supp. IV 1980).
6. 673 F.2d at 325.
7. The favored nations clause stated that:
If, at any time during the term of this agreement, Northern pays a producer of gas
in the State of Wyoming a price per one thousand (1,000) cubic feet that is higher
than the price being paid or otherwise payable under this contract, due consideration
being given to the quality of the gas, bases of measurement and conditions of sale,
Northern shall, commencing on the date of delivery of such gas at such higher price,
and continuing so long as such price is in excess of the price otherwise payable under
this contract, increase the price being paid or otherwise payable to Pan American
[predecessor in interest] hereunder to equal such higher price. It is the intention
hereof that the price to be paid Pan American hereunder shall at all times be equal to
the higher of the following: (a) the price payable under Article 5 of this contract, as
such price may have been changed by Article 7, or (b) the highest price paid by North-
ern to a producer of gas in the State of Wyoming.
Id at 324 n.2.
8. As unit operator, Amoco collected all payments for Beaver Creek Field gas from North-
ern Utilities and distributed shares respectively to Phillips and Kerr-McGee. Kerr-McGee
Corp. v. Northern Util., Inc., 500 F. Supp. 624, 627 (D. Wyo. 1980), rev'd, 673 F.2d 323 (10th
Cir.), cert. dented, 103 S. Ct. 344 (1982).
9. The paragraph stated that:
(b) From and after January 1, 1976, when the price to be paid by Northern to
Pan American [predecessor in interest] pursuant to the other provisions hereof is less
[Vol. 60:2
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McGee entered into similar supplemental agreements in 1973.
Prices received by other producers in the area were expected to exceed
the contract price beginning January 1, 1976, thereby triggering the provi-
sions of the new clause. The price increases were the result of actions by the
Federal Power Commission (FPC) and Congress.' 0 Amoco agreed to phase
in the new higher prices until July 1, 1978, when the clause would be fully
enforced. Kerr-McGee refused a phased installment of new prices and filed
suit against Northern Utilities; Northern Utilities, in turn, sued Amoco and
Phillips to enforce the price-triggering provisions of the contract." I
The district court determined that the provisions of paragraph 6(b) pro-
moted "an inequitable result, causing rate payers buying gas at retail to be
charged exorbitant prices for the natural gas involved in this case grossly
beyond any reasonable expectation of Northern as one of the contracting
parties."' 2 Neither Northern Utilities nor the three producers had contem-
plated at the time the supplemental agreement was executed that regulatory
and legislative actions would substantially change the terms of the contract
and obligate Northern Utilities to pay rates "greatly different or exorbitant
in comparison to rates incorporated in the contract between the parties.' 13
The new rate paid by Northern Utilities increased the contract price tenfold
in slightly more than four years, causing consumer monthly gas bills to rise
from $30 to $250.14
Summoning its equitable powers in a vitriolic tone, the district court
held paragraph 6(b) unconscionable under Wyoming statutory law 1 5 and
void as against public policy. The long-term nature of the contract and the
than the sum of the price received for gas being sold in interstate commerce, by any
producer within the State of Wyoming, except in the counties of Uinta and Lincoln,
plus three cents per one thousand cubic feet (3[cents]/Mcf), then Northern shall in-
crease the price to be paid Pan American hereunder to a price equal to the price being
received by such producer plus three cents per Mcf.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 673 F.2d at 325 n.4. Testimony from Amoco indicated that this clause was
not commonly used in the industry. Kerr-McGee Corp., 500 F. Supp. at 628.
10. In 1974, the Federal Power Commission began issuing a series of opinions affecting the
price of natural gas sold in interstate commerce. See Opinion No. 699-H, 52 F.P.C. 1604 (1974)
(maximum base rate established for gas sold in interstate commerce for wells spudded on or
after Jan. 1, 1973); Opinion No. 742, 54 F.P.C. 853 (1975) (maximum rate for sales by small
producers established at 130% of the applicable base ceiling rate for large producers as an incen-
tive for additional gas development by small producers); Opinion No. 770, 56 F.P.C. 509, modi-
fied, No. 770-A, 56 F.P.C. 2698 (1976) (amended Opinion No. 770, continued vintage
distinctions between old and new gas and added vintage distinctions within the new gas cate-
gory). None of the producers selling to Northern Utilities would have qualified for the increased
prices for gas set by Opinion No. 669-H, 52 F.P.C. 1604 (1974) and Opinion No. 742, 54 F.P.C.
853 (1975) had they been selling their gas within the interstate market. Kerr-McGee Corp., 500 F.
Supp. at 630. Only paragraph 6(b) allowed the producers to benefit by the price increases.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 673 F.2d at 325-26 n.7.
Under § 105 of the NGPA, maximum lawful prices for gas sales under intrastate contracts
existing at the passage of the Act were established at the lower of the contract price or the
maximum price as computed under § 102 of the NGPA. 15 U.S.C. § 3315 (Supp. IV 1980).
The NGPA also provided for the price decontrol of certain categories of the natural gas by Jan.
1, 1985. Id § 3331.
11. 673 F.2d at 325.
12. Kerr-McGee Corp., 500 F. Supp. at 632.
13. Id.
14. Id at 633.
15. WYo. STAT. § 34-21-219 (1977) provides:
1983]
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inability of Northern Utilities to reduce the impact of the price increase by
selling surplus gas on the interstate market placed Northern Utilities in a
position from which no relief could be obtained. Also, paragraph 6(b) re-
moved all price restraints from the contract, providing windfalls to the pro-
ducers and "unjustly burdensome and harsh results to the consumers."'
6
Finally, the court ruled that because the price escalation clause operated to
increase prices without reference to the economics and circumstances of the
particular gas field, it could not be upheld.
The Tenth Circuit, per Judge Seymour, upheld paragraph 6(b) as com-
patible with federal policy as set forth in the NGPA, and not unconscionable
or violative of Wyoming public policy. 17 The court found the price increases
triggered under the escalator clause to be within the confines of maximum
rates established by the NGPA. These rates, although high, were consistent
with federal policy to promote energy conservation; Congress had weighed
the benefits of such rates against the effect on consumers when enacting the
legislation. 18
Relying on an earlier Wyoming decision upholding a favored nations
clause,' 9 and the Wyoming legislature's decision not to restrict the operation
of indefinite price escalator clauses as permitted under the NGPA,20 the ap-
pellate court held indefinite price escalator provisions to be in accord with
Wyoming public policy. Using a four-part test not relied on by the trial
court, the Tenth Circuit concluded that paragraph 6(b) was conscionable
under Wyoming law. The court considered: 1) the protesting party's depri-
(a) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconsciona-
ble clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid
any unconscionable result.
(b) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity
to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in
making the determination.
16. Kerr-McGee Corp., 500 F. Supp. at 635.
17. Kerr-McGee Corp., 673 F.2d at 325.
18. Id at 326.
19. The court focused its attention on Amoco Prod. Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 612 P.2d
463 (Wyo. 1980), where the Wyoming Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether vintaging
was to be taken into account in triggering a favored nations clause operational on ceiling prices
set higher than the contract price by regulatory agencies. The district court in Kerr-McGee con-
cluded that because no argument was made in Stauffer that the clause involved was unconscion-
able or void as against public policy, the decision was not controlling. 500 F. Supp. at 636. The
Tenth Circuit noted that regardless of the absence of public policy argument in the Stauffer
briefs, the Stauffer court had upheld the clause as a well-recognized contractual provision. 673
F.2d at 327-28.
The term "vintage" is used to indicate the period during which a gas sale contract was
made. See 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS
811 (1981).
20. The NGPA provided that states may establish price restrictions on the sale of natural
gas produced within the state below the maximum price levels established by the NGPA:
"Nothing in this chapter shall affect the authority of any State to establish or enforce any maxi-
mum lawful price for the first sale of natural gas produced in such state which does not exceed
the applicable maximum lawful price, if any, under subchapter I of this chapter." 15 U.S.C.
§ 3432 (Supp. IV 1980). See Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 230
Kan. 176, 630 P.2d 1142 (1981),aJt'd, 103 S. Ct. 697 (1983) where the effect of such a restriction
was at issue.
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vation of a meaningful choice in deciding whether to enter into the contract;
2) the party's compulsion to accept the terms; 3) the existence of an opportu-
nity for meaningful negotiation; and 4) the existence of a gross inequality of
bargaining power.2' Citing evidence of lengthy negotiations engaged in by
all parties to the contract, statements made to the Wyoming Public Service
Commission by Northern Utilities regarding the difficulty in obtaining long-
term gas commitments, and the advantages of entering into the subject con-
tracts, the Tenth Circuit held that the evidence failed to demonstrate uncon-
scionability under Wyoming law. Furthermore, the court held that
unconscionability is determined at the making of the contract; a subsequent
increase in value or price will not serve to render a contract unconscionable
under Wyoming law.
22
Because the Tenth Circuit's reasoning promises to raise serious conflicts
in the future regarding operation of indefinite price escalation clauses in gas
sales contracts, a brief history of legal challenges in this area will be helpful.
The purpose of favored nations clauses in gas sales contracts is to induce
producers to commit supplies to long-term contracts by assuring that they
will be able to take advantage of current prices. 23 While most challenges to
favored nations clauses dispute whether the clause has been triggered, giving
rise to higher prices,24 a few early cases questioned whether price escalation
21. Kerr-McGee Corp., 673 F.2d at 329.
22. Id at 329. The court relied upon Bernina Distrib., Inc. v. Bernina Sewing Mach., 646
F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1981) and In re Estate of Frederick, 599 P.2d 550 (Wyo. 1979).
23. As stated in Louisiana-Nevada Transit Co. v. Woods, 393 F. Supp. 177 (W.D. Ark.
1975):
The Favored Nations Clause obviously is not a buyer's clause since it can only have
the effect of increasing the buyer's cost of gas ...
Obviously, a seller has no interest in committing his gas to long term contracts at
a fixed price in the face of such rapidly increasing prices. The Favored Nations Clause
is a tool to enable a buyer to induce a seller to commit gas reserves to the buyer for a
long period of time. It is the buyer's assurance to the seller that the seller will always
be receiving a price for his gas equal to the current price.
Id at 184.
In Hall v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 359 So. 2d 255 (La. Ct. App. 1978), amended and
remanded, 368 So. 2d 984 (La. 1979), a27'd in part, vacated in part, 453 U.S. 571 (1981), the court
stated that "[tihe basic purpose of a price adjustment or Favored Nations clause is to protect a
seller from discrimination by the pipe-line purchaser of gas under a long-term contract." 359
So. 2d at 262. Finally, the Wyoming Supreme Court, in Amoco Prod. Co. v. Stauffer Chem.
Co., 612 P.2d 463 (Wyo. 1980) noted that "It]he nature of the product and its questionable
availability engenders reluctance on the part of producers to enter into long term contracts at
the price prevailing at the time of the contract. Yet purchasers require long term commitments
to insure an adequate supply of gas." Id at 468.
24. See, e.g., Superior Oil Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co., 604 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1979)
(vintaging not included within clause, so buyer required to pay higher price even though lower
vintage price applied to gas at issue); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 505 F.
Supp. 628 (D. Kan. 1980) (clause triggered by establishment of maximum prices by FPC); Loui-
siana-Nevada Transit v. Woods, 393 F. Supp. 177 (W.D. Ark. 1975) (gas involved in other sales
was comparable enough to trigger clause); Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light
Co., 230 Kan. 176, 630 P.2d 1142 (1981), affid, 103 S. Ct. 697 (1983); Mesa Petroleum Co. v.
Kansas Power & Light Co., 230 Kan. 166, 630 P.2d 1129 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 927 (1982)
(clause not triggered by enactment of NGPA); Hall v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 359 So. 2d
255 (La. Ct. App. 1978), amended and remanded, 368 So. 2d 984 (La. 1979), a.'d in par, vacated in
part, 453 U.S. 571 (1981) (favored nations clause triggered by increased payment of royalty);
Tuthill v. Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 614 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (clause not
triggered by FPC opinions because gas was not within the classifications affected by opinions);
Lone Star Gas Co. v. Howard Corp., 556 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), error ej/dn.r e., 568
1983]
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clauses violated public policy.2 5 These challenges generally were of little
significance.
Then, in 1961 the FPC issued Order No. 232 proscribing the use of
indefinite price escalation clauses in gas sales contracts within its jurisdic-
tion.2 6 The order declared all indefinite price escalation clauses, including
favored-nation, redetermination, and spiral escalation clauses,2 7 to be "un-
desirable, unnecessary, and incompatible with the public interest," having
"contributed to instability and uncertainty concerning prices of gas."'28 The
order went on to provide all such clauses in new contracts within the Com-
mission's jurisdiction to be inoperative and of no effect at law.
29
Order No. 232 was accompanied by a FPC decision in Pure Oil Co. ,30 in
which the Commission discussed the reasoning behind its determination that
indefinite price escalation clauses were contrary to the public interest. Al-
though the Commission recognized the necessity of long-term contractual
relations for the sale of natural gas and the need to maintain investment
values for producers in the face of rising costs, it deemed indefinite price
escalation clauses to result in price increases unrelated to factors bearing on
the value of gas, such as cost of production. The clauses were found to result
in gas price increases without economic or other substantial justification. 3 1
S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1978) (gas involved in other sales was comparable enough to trigger clause);
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 612 P.2d 463 (Wyo. 1980) (vintaging not a factor in
triggering clause).
25. Set In re Lexia Buchanan, 14 FPC 831 (1955), where the Brooklyn Union Gas Co. and
Long Island Lighting Co. sought to intervene in FPC proceedings concerning a certificate of
public convenience and necessity to strike price escalation clauses as being against the public
interest.
26. 25 F.P.C. 379, amended, 25 F.P.C. 609 (1961).
27. See supra note 3.
28. 25 F.P.C. at 380.
29. Commissioner Kline, concurring in part and dissenting in part, stated that although he
believed indefinite price escalation clauses to be contrary to the public interest, he did not think
all such clauses as defined within the FPC order should be proscribed. In particular, Kline said
clauses allowing price renegotiation strike a proper balance between the interests of producers
and purchasers:
[A] producer should have a contractual right to renegotiate his contract price at some
time in the future in order to protect himself against inflation or other unforeseen
contingencies. He should not be compelled to agree at the beginning of his contract to
a fixed price for the gas twenty or fifty years in the future, when conditions may be
wholly different.
A contract providing for renegotiation of the price at some future date, and for
arbitration in event the parties fail to agree, merely gives the producer the right to file
for such price. The Commission will, of course, disallow it in event it is not a just and
reasonable price. Since the gas is already committed to the pipeline, the producer will
not have any distinct bargaining advantage.
Id. at 381 (Kline, Comm'r, concurring in part, dissenting in part).
30. 25 F.P.C. 383 (1961), aJ'd, 299 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1962). The decision involved an
interpretation of a two-party favored nations clause between Pure Oil Co. and El Paso Natural
Gas Co. The Commission extended its decision to apply to all indefinite price escalation
clauses.
31. The Commission concluded:
[U]nder Pure's provisions, the company's prices are subject to triggering if El Paso
pays any other producer within the specified area a higher price. There need be no
economic or other substantial justification for the increase; the mere fact that a higher
price is paid to some other producer would be sufficient to activate the increase. In
our view, such an artificial ground for a proposed increase, operating in such a
mechanical and arbitrary manner, and lacking any substantial relationship to the fac-
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Finally, the Commission found that indefinite price escalation clauses had
simply outlived their usefulness:
Assuming that indefinite escalation clauses in producer contracts
had some justification years ago, when a lack of purchaser outlets
and lack of consumer demand forced prices to abnormally low
levels, this justification no longer exists today, when purchasers of
gas are numerous, consumer demand is strong, and buyers are
competing eagerly for available supplies of gas. In our judgment,
in the light of continuing increases in the price of gas in recent
years and the present high level of prices, escalation clauses such as
Pure's have by now outlived whatever economic function they may
have had.
32
Order No. 232 was amended within a month to allow for limited price-rede-
termination provisions within contracts subject to FPC jurisdiction.
33
In 1962 the FPC ordered that contracts within its jurisdiction contain-
ing indefinite price escalation clauses be rejected.34 Then, in 1966, the FPC
issued Order No. 329,35 allowing for area rate escalations to operate. Thus,
escalation clauses were permissible if they did not exceed the applicable ceil-
ing rate established by the Commission. Escalations below the ceiling rate
prescribed by the FPC were deemed to be within the public interest because
the ceiling rate was based on a cost-based methodology having economic
tors which bear on the value of gas or on a determination of a reasonable level of rates
for it, does not constitute a proper basis for filing proposed increased rates ....
Id. at 389. The Commission also rejected arguments by Pure Oil Co. that indefinite price esca-
lation clauses further the free market system:
[I]t is fallacious to assume that the price for only one or a few sales, which is all that is
needed to activate a large number of producer prices under escalation provisions, is
representative of market conditions generally. In fact, escalation provisions such as
Pure's are the opposite of giving effect to prevailing market prices; instead, the prices
for sales of one or a few particular producers apply to and increase the level of market
prices generally.
Id at 391. The basis of FPC producer rate regulation was the cost-based methodology for
utility rate regulation. Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 645 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1142 (1982).
32. 25 F.P.C. at 391. The Commission also dismissed comparisons and benefits occurring
from indefinite price escalation clauses used in other industries, such as cotton, as having little
relationship to natural gas contracts:
[P]ricing practices appropriate to such commodities and businesses, which are either
unregulated or are subject to a type of regulation wholly unlike the regulation pro-
vided for by the [Natural Gas] Act, have little applicability in determining proper
pricing practices for the regulated producer segment of the natural gas industry.
Id
33. FPC Order No. 232-A, 25 F.P.C. 609 (1961), amending, 25 F.P.C. 379 (1961). The order
allowed gas prices to be redetermined at no more than five-year intervals within the life of a gas
sale contract. All other indefinite price escalation clauses remained barred. The Commission
thereby partially adopted Commissioner Kline's recommendation in Order No. 232. See supra
note 29.
34. FPC Order No. 242, 27 F.P.C. 339 (1962). The Commission adopted this restriction to
protect "the public against waves of [price] increases which have no defensible basis" and to
ease the regulatory burden of considering rate increase filings whenever such clauses were trig-
gered. Id at 340. The Commission derived its power to reject contracts from § 7 of the Natural
Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1976), which required producers selling gas on the interstate market
to receive Commission permission in the form of a certificate of public convenience and neces-
sity. Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 645 F.2d 360, 366 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denid, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982).
Order No. 242 was upheld in FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964). See In re Permian Basin
Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 782-83 (1968).
35. 36 F.P.C. 927 (1966).
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significance to the gas in question. 36
Essentially, the same reasoning was employed in 1979 after the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) took over the duties of the FPC
37
and the NGPA38 established new gas ceiling rates. FERC ruled in Order
2339 that indefinite price escalation clauses could operate within the confines
of the ceiling rates established by the NGPA, since those rates had been
deemed just and reasonable by Congress.
40
Challenges to indefinite price escalation clauses based on the issues of
public policy and unconscionability resurfaced shortly after passage of the
NGPA, despite the FPC and FERC's position that the clauses could operate
within rate ceilings. The first judicial expression on the matter was in Supe-
rior Oil Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co. ,4i where Tenth Circuit Judge Barrett, in a
concurring opinion, reiterated earlier rejections of such clauses as being
against public policy because they bore no relationship to production costs
or other economic justification.
42
In Amoco Production Co. v. Kansas Power & Light Co. ,43 the District Court
of the United States District of Kansas considered whether a windfall price
increase triggered by a favored nations clause was unconscionable and void
for public policy reasons, even though the price remained below the highest
ceiling rate. The subject favored nations clause was tied to FPC and FERC
pricing activities, which triggered the clause, permitting Amoco to recognize
a 263% increase in the price of its gas.
4 4
The district court, relying on Superior Oil Co., concluded that such
clauses are not per se unconscionable and against public policy, and upheld
the clause by distinguishing the circumstances surrounding the Amoco-Kan-
sas Power & Light Co. favored nations clause from those before the district
court in Kerr-AiMcGee Corp. Kansas Power & Light Co.'s participation in draft-
ing the contract and knowledge that the clause could cause sizeable price
increases weighed against the unconscionability arguments. 45 Furthermore,
no inequality in bargaining power that would evidence unconscionability
36. Pennzoil v. FERC, 645 F.2d 360, 366 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982).
See Watson, The Natural Gas Pohy Act of 1978 and Gas Purchase Contracts, 27B ROCKY MTN. MIN.
L. INST. 1407, 1418-19 (1982) (where an area rate was by definition just and reasonable, the
Commission was prevented from asserting that the collection of area rates was against public
policy). Until 1974, the FPC prescribed rates for gas within particular areas based on locational
values. The FPC then adopted nationwide rates of general applicability. 51 F.P.C. 2212
(1974).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (Supp. IV 1980).
39. 44 Fed. Reg. 16,895 (1979). The order reserved to state law the determination of
whether such clauses operate in intrastate contracts.
40. For a discussion on the limitations placed upon indefinite price escalation clauses by
the NGPA, see Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 645 F.2d 360, 376-78 (5th Cir. 1981),cert. dented, 454 U.S.
1142 (1982).
41. 604 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1979).
42. Id at 1295-96 (Barrett, J., concurring). Apparently, Judge Barrett would have de-
clared such clauses void against public policy regardless of whether they operated within legisla-
tively defined price ceilings.
43. 505 F. Supp. 628 (D. Kan. 1980).
44. Id at 636.
45. Id at 639.
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was established. The court stressed that supply and demand, not production
costs, should determine the price of gas."6
Finally, Energy Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Lighl Co. "7 considered the
validity of a state law that limited the effect of favored nations clauses by
graduating the introduction of higher natural gas prices into the Kansas
economy. 4 8 The Kansas Supreme Court upheld the restrictions imposed on
such clauses. Quoting the trial court, the opinion noted that states have "a
bona fide interest in addressing, and hopefully controlling, the serious eco-
nomic dislocations that a sudden introduction of significantly higher energy
costs would produce."'4 9
The foregoing decisions, although not fully applicable to Kerr-McGee
Corp. and the intrastate contract involved, demonstrate the nature and vigor
of the challenges to favored nations clauses based on arguments of public
policy and unconscionability. Similar challenges are certain to arise in the
future, particularly as conflicting interests between producers and consumers
continue to intensify.
Several issues merit further consideration. The first concerns the uncon-
scionability argument. In determining the conscionability of the favored na-
tions clause in Kerr-McGee Corp., one factor the Tenth Circuit examined was
the expertise of the negotiators for both parties to the contract, 50 thus weigh-
46. Id. The court recognized that the price increases would be borne by Kansas Power &
Light Co.'s customers, some of whom lack the resources to pay the higher costs, but found that a
low-income energy assistance program operated by the State of Kansas and funded by the
Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 17, 19, 26, 31, 42 U.S.C.), mitigated the impact of the favored nations clause
upon the public. 505 F. Supp. at 639-40.
47. 230 Kan. 176, 630 P.2d 1142 (1981), afad, 103 S. Ct. 697 (1983).
48. The NGPA grants states the authority to establish price restrictions on the sale of natu-
ral gas produced within a particular state below the maximum price levels established by the
NGPA. 15 U.S.C. § 3432 (Supp. IV 1980); see supra note 20.
49. 230 Kan. at 188, 630 P.2d at 1152. The court relied heavily upon legislative intent and
the evils sought to be regulated:
Proponents believe that as a result of this legislation, many producers of natural gas,
especially those whose contracts contain indefinite price escalator clauses, will reap
unanticipated, windfall financial benefits. These benefits bear no real relationship to
the cost of production of new gas, and are not even remotely related to old gas produc-
tion costs. They accrue solely because of the reversal of federal policy.
The producers wil benefit beyond any expectations that they miht have had only afew
years ago and the consumers, already buffeted by rapidly increasing inflation, including
spiraling utility costs, will pay.
... . [T]he majority of the Committee is strongly convinced that the single issue
of the benefits to be derived by the affected Kansas consumers of natural gas clearly
outweighs any adverse effects the gas producers or royalty owners said the bill might
have.
Id. at 187-88, 630 P.2d 1151-52 (emphasis in original).
The United States Supreme Court agreed, stating that the state could reasonably have
found that higher gas prices attributable to the escalation clauses would mean hardship on
persons with fixed incomes who use gas heat. Moreover, the Court said, the state had a legiti-
mate interest in eliminating unforeseen windfall profits. Finally, the Court found significant the
fact that the parties were already operating in a heavily regulated industry and did not expect
the advent of deregulated prices at the execution of the contracts in holding that the state had
not impaired any contract by restricting the escalator clauses. Energy Group, Inc., 103 S. Ct. at
706-09.
50. 673 F.2d at 330.
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ing the parties' bargaining power. 51 While consideration of equality of the
parties at the bargaining table is appropriate to determine unconscionabil-
ity, it ignores the power of producers who command great control over di-
minishing natural resources, such as natural gas. 52 Since gas is a basic
commodity, with limited supplies and substitutes, assertions that size and
experience of bargaining parties are conclusive -as to the equitable nature of
the contract ignores the economic realities of the industry.
Also, the unconscionability issue can be restated: should a heightened
demand by one consumer be allowed to trigger gas prices for consumers
whose demand is less great?5 3 Favored nations clauses may actually distort
the concept that demand determines value.
The second area of consideration is public policy. Recent cases dealing
with favored nations clauses and public policy demonstrate that administra-
tive and legislative acceptance of such clauses does not automatically shield
favored nations clauses from challenges based upon public policy. 54 These
challenges are certain to resurface with renewed vigor following the deregu-
lation of certain natural gas pricing in 1985,55 when conflicting interests of
producers and consumers are certain to reach a zenith.
The Tenth Circuit in Kerr-McGee Corp. suggests that because Congress
took these interests into account in enacting the NGPA with its deregulation
provisions, Congress also acted in the public interest by allowing indefinite
price escalation clauses to operate once deregulation occurs.5 6 The court's
suggestion comports with earlier decisions which recognize Congress as act-
51. Gross inequality of bargaining power is a characteristic of an unconscionable bargain.
See In re Estate of Frederick, 599 P.2d 550 (Wyo. 1979), cited in Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern
Util., Inc., 673 F.2d 323, 328-29 (10th Cir. 1982); see also Amoco Prod. Co. v. Kansas Power &
Light Co., 505 F. Supp. 628, 639 (D. Kan. 1980) where the court considered the bargaining
power of the parties in determining whether the favored nations clause involved was
unconscionable.
52. Northern Utilities relied upon the Beaver Creek Field for 85% of its total supply of gas.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 673 F.2d at 324. The Tenth Circuit stressed the difficulties expressed by
Northern Utilities in obtaining long-term gas commitments and the advantages it would derive
from the amended contract, as evidence of an equitable bargain. d. at 329-30. The same
circumstances may, however, be evidence of a contract entered into out of fear of diminishing
supplies and competition with larger utilities.
53. See supra note 31.
54. Judge Barrett's concurring opinion in Superior Oil Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co., 604
F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1979) suggests that favored nations clauses should be void against public
policy regardless of whether they operate within the confines of maximum lawful rates which
have been deemed reasonable through the regulatory process. Also, the court in Amoco Prod.
Co. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 505 F. Supp. 628, 636 (D. Kan. 1980), considered the ques-
tion of whether a 283% increase in the price of gas, triggered by a favored nations clause, was
enough in itself to render the clause void as unconscionable and against public policy, regardless
of the fact that the increase fell below maximum rates.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 3331 (Supp. IV 1980). See Zimmer & McEvoy, Petitions for Generic Rulemak-
ing: Passthrough of Gs Costs and Associated Contract Policies, NAT. RESOURCEs L. NEWSLETTER,
spring 1982, at 1, col. 2, for a discussion on petitions to FERC requesting a reconsideration of
policy regarding indefinite price escalator clauses for deregulated natural gas.
56. The court stated:
One of the primary purposes of the NGPA is to promote energy conservation. Con-
gress believed that allowing producers to recover high prices for their gas helps imple-
ment this goal. "High energy prices provide one motivation to conserve energy.
Because of these prices, an enormous range of energy conserving improvements are
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ing in the public interest in deregulating natural gas prices.
57
As a result of the court's decision, indefinite price escalation clauses,
once allowed to operate only within the confines of ceiling rates founded on
justness and reasonableness, will be allowed to operate in a free market sys-
tem because that system has been deemed to be in the public interest. The
holding, however, will not preclude challenges that the operation of favored
nations clauses within the system must also be in the public interest.
B. Federal Leases
.t
In Kirkpatrick Oil &Gas Co. v. United States ,58 the Tenth Circuit held that
a state communitization order may not bind federally-owned land or extend
leases of federally-owned land within the unit absent consent from the Secre-
tary of the Interior. Kirkpatrick Oil & Gas Co. had acquired oil and gas
leases on federally-owned land in Oklahoma for a primary term of ten years,
extendible upon production in paying quantities. When Kirkpatrick failed
to drill on the leases within the primary term, the United States sought to
terminate the leases. Kirkpatrick resisted, claiming that the leases had been
extended by virtue of a state drilling and spacing order that placed the fed-
eral lands and nearby non-federal lands in the same unit. The company
asserted that its oil and gas production on the non-federal land served to
extend the federal leases in the same unit. The government contended that
state communitization orders are binding upon federal lands only when ap-
proved by the Secretary of Interior.
59
The court agreed with the government, relying upon the test articulated
in Wal/is v. Pan American Petroleum Corp. 60 to determine whether application
of state law to federal mineral lease issues poses a "significant threat to any
identifiable federal policy or interest. '6 1 The court found that state-imposed
acreage requirements and unit boundaries could conflict with the Secretary
of Interior's judgment regarding acreage and boundary standards for conser-
vation under the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920.62 The court also held
that federal lessees should not be able to circumvent the requirement for the
cost effective." S. Rep. No. 409, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 36, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 8800, 8806.
.... Congress was well aware of the economic impact on consumers that would
result from the operation of indefinite price escalator clauses.
673 F.2d at 326-27; see Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 645 F.2d 360, 378-79 (5th Cir. 1981),cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1142 (1982).
57. The court in Amoco Prod. Co. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 505 F. Supp. 628, 639 (D.
Kan. 1980) stated:
[I]n the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (Pub. L. No. 95-621), Congress expressed a
policy of eventually allowing prices to go unregulated by the year 1985. . . . By 1985,
the price of deregulated natural gas will assuredly seem exorbitant, and since it is such
an essential commodity for most of the public, hardship will result. Nevertheless, this
Court must be cognizant of these developments in public policy. The price of deregu-
lated gas will be determined by supply and demand rather than the cost of
production.
58. 675 F.2d 1122 (10th Cir. 1982).
59. Id. at 1124; see 30 U.S.C. § 2260) (1976).
60. 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966).
61. Kirkpatrick, 675 F.2d at 1126 (1966).
62. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-263 (1976).
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Secretary's approval by securing a state pooling order.
63
In another oil and gas decision, True Oil Co. o. FERC,64 the Tenth Cir-
cuit construed the clause, "produced in commercial quantities," as requiring
either a capability to market, or a means of transportation of the product
from the producer to the consumer."5 The interpretation was adopted in a
determination of whether natural gas qualified as "new natural gas" under a
provision of the NGPA.
66
II. MINING LAW
A. Stock-Razsing Homestead Act
The Tenth Circuit, in Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Andrus,6 7 addressed the
question of whether gravel is a mineral reserved to the United States in pat-
ents granted under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916 (Act).6 8 In a
decision with the potential of affecting 70,362,406 acres of land, 69 the court
held that gravel is not a reserved mineral under the Act and consequently,
passed to the patentee.
In 1926, the United States conveyed a tract of land in Wyoming to
Western Nuclear's predecessor-in-interest by patent issued under the Act.
The patent, in accordance with the Act, reserved all coal and other minerals
to the United States. 70 After Western Nuclear purchased a portion of the
patented land in 1975, it sought a permit from the Wyoming Department of
Environmental Quality for a gravel pit. The department notified the Bu-
reau of Land Management of Western Nuclear's intentions and then
granted the permit. Western Nuclear removed some gravel before being
served with a Notice of Trespass under the Materials Act of 1947 and the
Surface Resources Act of 1955.71
The Interior Board of Land Appeals of the Department of Interior up-
held the Bureau of Land Management, finding that gravel was reserved to
the United States as a mineral under the Act, and any disposition of the
gravel other than through the Surface Resources Act of 1955 constituted
63. 675 F.2d at 1126.
64. 663 F.2d 75 (10th Cir. 1981).
65. Id at 78.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 3312(c)(1)(C)(ii) (Supp. IV 1980).
67. 664 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. grantedsub nom. Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 102
S. Ct. 2266 (1982).
68. 43 U.S.C. § 291 (1976).
69. Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Andrus, 475 F. Supp. 654, 658 (D. Wyo. 1979), rev'd, 664 F.2d
234 (10th Cir. 198 1),cert. grantedsub noma. Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 2266 (1982).
70. 664 F.2d at 235. The patent reserved the following: "Excepting and reserving, how-
ever, to the United States all the coal and other minerals in the lands so entered and patented,
together with the right to prospect for, mine, and remove the same pursuant to the provisions
and limitations of the Act of December 29, 1916." Id
71. Materials Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 291, 61 Stat. 681 (1947), amended by the Surface
Resources Act of 1955, 30 U.S.C. § 601 (1976). These Acts authorize the Secretaries of the
Interior and Agriculture to dispose of common varieties of gravel and other minerals on public
lands for adequate compensation. Id. Common varieties of sand and gravel are no longer
deemed valuable minerals subject to location under the mining laws, unless they possess a "dis-
tinct and special value." Id § 611.
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trespass. 72 Reviewing legislative intent and contemporaneous history, the
trial court determined that even though the term "mineral" had no definite
meaning in 1916, gravel is a reserved mineral under the Act. 73 The court
then reaffirmed the construction rule that mineral reservations are to be de-
cided in favor of the government when a. question exits. 74 In so holding,
Judge Kerr noted: "The mineral estate is a flexible entity which expands
with the development of the arts and sciences to include more minerals."' 75
The Tenth Circuit addressed both the Bureau of Land Management's
jurisdiction to issue the trespass notice and the definition of mineral within
the Act. Western Nuclear had argued that because the Surface Resources
Act of 1955 authorized disposition of gravel from public lands only, the Bu-
reau of Land Management had no jurisdiction over the subject lands, which
passed to private ownership by patent. Judge McWilliams, writing for the
court, rejected Western Nuclear's argument, saying that although the land
itself passed into private hands by patent, under the Act, the minerals re-
served to the United States remain subject to disposal in accordance with the
coal and mineral laws in force at the time of the disposal. 76 The disposal
provisions contemplate that the Department of Interior maintain continuing
jurisdiction over reserved minerals.
77
Turning to the definitional issue, the Tenth Circuit examined congres-
sional intent. Central to the court's holding was the 1910 decision, Zimmer-
man v. Brunson,78 in which the Department of Interior, "in the absence of
specific legislation by Congress," 79 refused to classify gravel as a mineral be-
cause standard authorities had failed to recognize such deposits as miner-
als.80 The court found the Zimmerman decision to be the keystone of
congressional intent at the time the Act was enacted,8i and regarded the
Department of Interior's subsequent overruling of Zimmerman as inconse-
72. Western Nuclear, Inc., 85 Interior Dec. 129, 139 (1978), affd, 475 F. Supp. 654 (D.
Wyo. 1979), rev'd, 664 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, sub noa. Watt v. Western Nuclear,
Inc., 102 S. Ct. 2266 (1982).
73. 475 F. Supp. at 656-60.
74. Id at 662.
75. Id at 663.
76. 43 U.S.C. § 299 (1976).
77. 664 F.2d at 237.
78. 39 Pub. Lands Dec. 310 (1910). Zimmerman was specifically overruled by Layman v.
Ellis, 52 Pub. Lands Dec. 714 (1929).
79. 39 Pub. Lands at 313.
80. Id at 312. The department said:
A search of the standard American authorities has failed to disclose a single one
which classifies a deposit [of gravel] as mineral, nor is the Department aware of any
application to purchase such a deposit under the mining laws. This, taken into consid-
eration with the further fact that deposits of sand and gravel occur with considerable
frequency in the public domain, points rather to a general understanding that such
deposits, unless they possess a peculiar property or characteristic giving them a special
value, were not to be regarded as mineral.
d
81. As the Tenth Circuit noted, "[wihen enacting the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of
1916, we presume that Congress was aware of the fact that the Department of the Interior had
determined that gravel was not a mineral for the purposes of either the mining laws or previous
homestead laws." 664 F.2d at 240.
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quential to determining congressional intent in 1916.82
The court then reviewed judicial opinions on the issue of gravel as a
mineral, arising after passage of the Act. Particularly revealing to the court
was the case of Bumpus v. United States ,83 in which the government had taken
the position that gravel was not a mineral because it was so much a part of
the surface that it should be considered part of the surface estate.84 Also of
significance was State ex rel. State Highway Commiss'on v. Trujiwlo ,85 in which the
New Mexico Supreme Court held that gravel was included within the min-
eral reservation of the Act. 86 The court found the reasoning in State Land
Board v. State Department of Fish & Game, 87 to be persuasive on the issue of
whether gravel is to be construed as a mineral. In State Land Board, the State
of Utah had conveyed property to its Fish and Game Department, reserving
all coal and other minerals. The Utah Supreme Court held that sand and
gravel deposits are so common in the Rocky Mountain region that a reserva-
tion of such deposits as minerals would nullify a grant of the surface estate.88
The Tenth Circuit adopted this reasoning from State Land Board as support
that gravel is not a reserved mineral under the Act.
8 9
Although the court relied on Zimmerman and State Land Board in deter-
mining that gravel was passed to all patentees under the Stock-Raising
Homestead Act, the opinion in Western Nuclear, Inc. fails to reconcile these
earlier cases' assertions that in some circumstances, gravel may have the req-
uisite special value to be classified as a mineral.90 Indeed, the court in Zm-
merman simply held that the close proximity of a gravel deposit to a town or
82. The Department of Interior held gravel to be a locatable mineral in ILayman v. Ellis,
52 Pub. Lands Dec. 714 (1929).
83. 325 F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1963).
84. Unlike reservations under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916, the reservation in
Burnpus involved condemnation proceedings by the United States in which "all oil, gas and
other minerals" were reserved to the private landowners, who subsequently sought to remove
gravel pursuant to their reservation. Id at 265-66.
85. 82 N.M. 694, 487 P.2d 122 (1971).
86. The court noted that although the New Mexico Supreme Court disagreed with earlier
Tenth Circuit interpretations of the Act, the discrepancies were not essential to the definitional
issue. Western Muclear, Inc., 664 F.2d at 241.
87. 17 Utah 2d 237, 408 P.2d 707 (1965).
88. Id at 239, 408 P.2d at 708. The Utah Supreme Court recognized, however, that gravel
may be so scarce in some areas as to have extraordinary value within the area. In such circum-
stances, gravel may properly be considered a mineral subject to reservation. Id at 240, 408 P.2d
at 709.
89. [Tihe gravel lying under and upon appellant's land is so closely related to the
surface estate, that it is a part and parcel of it. If such common substances were con-
sidered to be included within the mineral reservation, then under all the many patents
issued pursuant to the Stock-Raising Homestead Act, the patentees would own only
the dirt, and little or nothing more. Such would be at odds with the nature of the
terrain in the Rocky Mountain region, where rocks abound. And if ordinary rocks are
not reserved minerals, it follows that gravel, a form of fragmented rock, also is not a
reserved mineral.
664 F.2d at 242. In so holding, the court distinguished United States v. 1,253.14 Acres of Land,
455 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1972), in which the court, relying upon extrinsic evidence relating to a
reservation of "all mineral, including oil and gas," held gravel to be included within the reserva-
tion. The Tenth Circuit also distinguished United States v. Union Oil Co., 549 F.2d 1271 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977), where the Act was held to pass to patentees only that part
of the public domain sufficient to support homesteaders by raising livestock. Hence, the deci-
sion held geothermal steam was reserved to the United States under the Act.
90. See supra notes 80 and 88 and accompanying text.
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city, and whose sole use is for building, does not qualify gravel as a min-
eral.9 1 Subsequent decisions, such as State Land Board, suggest the determina-
tion must be made according to the facts of the case.92 Western Nuclear, Inc.,
however, suggests no such ad hoc consideration. Thus, patentees may now be
entitled to full development of gravel under their patent, without accounting
to the federal government.
B. Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1970
In two decisions, Rosebud Coal Sales Co., Inc. v. Andus,9 3 and California
Portland Cement Co. v. Andrus, 94 the Tenth Circuit strictly enforced the time
period under which the Department of Interior can readjust the terms of a
lease under the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920.95 This Act allows the
federal government to readjust the royalty terms and other terms of leases
issued under the Act at the end of every twenty-year period.96
Rosebud Coal Sales, Inc. and California Portland Cement Co. were is-
sued coal leases in 1935 providing for readjustment at the end of 1975.
97
Neither lessee received notice of the government's intent to readjust the
terms of its lease until 1977, although the Bureau of Land Management be-
gan considering readjusting Rosebud's coal lease seven months prior to the
readjustment date.98
The Tenth Circuit, per Chief Judge Seth, rejected the government's ar-
gument that it was too preoccupied with basic coal leasing policy to give
notice before the end of the lease period. The court held that the govern-
ment must act to readjust terms of its leases before the end of the twenty-
year period established under the Act, unless the government can demon-





United States v. Mller' ° ° presented the Tenth Circuit with the unusual
situation of the use of criminal prosecution to settle a property dispute. The
court, recognizing the circumstances as involving merely a question of right
to possession, held the prosecution to be an abuse of process.
91. 39 Pub. Lands Dec. at 313.
92. [W]e note that the holding herein is not intended to exclude the possibility that
there might be some area where sand and gravel are so scarce and difficult to obtain
that a deposit of those materials would have such an extraordinary value within that
area that they could properly be considered as coming within the definition of "min-
eral" as we have hereinabove set out ....
17 Utah 2d at 239-40, 408 P.2d at 709.
93. 667 F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1982).
94. 667 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1982).
95. 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1976).
96. Id. § 207(a).
97. Rosebud Coal, 667 F.2d at 950; California Portland, 667 F.2d at 954.
98. Rosebud Coat, 667 F.2d at 953; Calornia Portland, 667 F.2d at 954.
99. Rosebud Coal, 667 F.2d at 953.
100. 659 F.2d 1029 (10th Cir. 1981).
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In 1905, the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes, now known as the Wind
River tribes, ceded about half of the Wind River Indian Reservation in Wy-
oming to the United States for homestead entry. Non-Indians, including the
Miller family, were issued patents to land within the reservation boundaries
until 1939, when the remaining unsold land was given back to the tribes.' 0 1
The Millers homesteaded within the reservation in the early 1900's, and in
1929 purchased several other homesteads not far from their homesite, adja-
cent to and outside the western boundary of the reservation. Access to the
outer property is limited to two routes: a three-quarter-of-a-mile drive across
reservation property, and a drive across private property. 10 2 The private
property is barred to travelers; as a result, the Miller family crossed the reser-
vation for fifty years to gain access to their land.1
0 3
In September 1978, defendant Larry Miller received a notice from the
Bureau of Indian Affairs that further trespass on tribal lands would be sub-
ject to prosecution under the Wyoming criminal trespass statute. 10 4 The
government argued that as trustee of the Indians, it had a duty to establish
Indian sovereignty over the property. The government decided to file the
action pursuant to the criminal trespass statute, believing that a civil remedy
was unnecessary where a statute provided an express remedy. 105 The de-
fendant took the position that he had a colorable claim of right to use the
road for access to his property. The trial court, chastising the Bureau of
Indian Affairs for its "administrative ineptitude" 0 6 and failure to arrive at a
compromise by which Miller could reach his property, nonetheless sentenced
Miller under the statute.1
0 7
The Tenth Circuit, noting that both parties and the trial court recog-
nized the issue to be whether Miller was entitled to cross the reservation to
reach his land, distinguished between acts of trespass with an intent to re-
main upon the property of another without lawful authority and those acts
of entry made in good faith under a claim of right.' 0 8 The court held that to
apply a criminal trespass statute to the latter act is an abuse of process in
which "a legal procedure is perverted to accomplish an ulterior purpose for
which it was not designed."' 1 9 In so holding, the court relied on the same
101. Id at 1030.
102. Id
103. Indian regulations required that a one-day permit be obtained before the Millers could
drive cattle across the reservation; the defendant sought an annual permit to avoid traveling
fifty miles one way to obtain a daily permit, but was told that annual permits were against
Indian regulations. Id at 1031. The Tenth Circuit mentioned in passing that the daily permit
requirements should be abolished as a possible infringement upon a landowner's due process
rights not to be denied access to his property without an opportunity to be heard. Id ; see Dry
Creek Lodge v. Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes, 515 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1975).
104. WYo. STAT. § 6-10-102 (1977) was assimilated through 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1976) and
made applicable to the Wind River Indian Reservation under 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1976). 659 F.2d at
1030.
105. Id. at 1031-32.
106. Id at 1032.
107. Id as 1030. The trial court fully recognized that the dispute did not involve a criminal
law question. The government claimed that civil proceedings would delay the outcome. Id at
1031.
108. Id. at 1033.
109. Id.
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distinction made in People v. Johnson, 10 in which the court held that the
requisite criminal intent to remain on the lands of another without lawful
authority is lacking where a claim of right is asserted. The Tenth Circuit
regarded as irrelevant the government's emphasis upon the fact that owner-
ship of the property was undisputed; appropriate governmental action was a
civil proceeding.
In another trespass action, Uni'tedStates v. Osterlund,t 't the Tenth Circuit
held that courts cannot award damages as an alternative to issuing orders
enjoining continued occupancy of government land by a trespasser. The
United States had sought to enjoin Osterlund's occupancy on federal land
when it discovered that his residence was located within the boundaries of
the Arapahoe-Roosevelt National Forest. The trial court found for the gov-
ernment as a matter of law and ordered Osterlund to vacate the property.' 12
In his appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Osterlund argued that the trial
court, in its equitable discretion, should have awarded the government dam-
ages and permitted continued occupancy. The Tenth Circuit rejected Os-
terlund's argument, holding that courts have no power to adjust equities
against the federal government in title disputes involving federal lands be-
cause Congress' trust powers over the public land are unlimited; courts can-
not infringe upon the trust powers by saying how the trust is to be
administered. If the court had granted relief in the form of damages, it
essentially would have forced the sale of a portion of the national forest and
prescribed conditions for the continued occupancy of the land, actions that




Two decisions reinforced tribal authority over non-Indians within reser-
vation boundaries. The first decision upholds the sovereign powers of tribes
to enforce tribal zoning ordinances against non-Indian fee owners of land
within a reservation. The second decision upholds the power of tribes to
prevent states from enforcing state game laws against non-Indians within a
reservation.
In Knight v. Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian Tribes,' 14 defendants James and
Karen Knight, both non-Indian fee owners of land within the Wind River
Indian Reservation in west-central Wyoming, sought to develop two subdivi-
sions on their land. After the Knights discussed their plans with Bureau of
Indian Affairs officials, the tribal government enacted a zoning code that
expressly applied to all lands within the reservation boundaries, including
110. 16 Mich. App. 745, 168 N.W.2d 913 (1969). See People v. Miller, 344 Ill. App. 574, 101
N.E.2d 874 (1951) (penal statute cannot be used to try title rights disputes); Steele v. State, 191
Ind. 350, 132 N.E. 739 (1921) (abuse of criminal trespass statute to try disputed rights in real
property); State v. Larason, 143 N.E.2d 502 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 1956) (abuse of criminal
trespass statute to use in real property right disputes).
111. 671 F.2d 1267 (10th Cir. 1982).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1268.
114. 670 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1982).
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those held in fee by non-Indians.t1 5 The code was neither recorded in
Fremont County records where the land is located, nor published in the Fed-
eral Register. The Fremont County Planning Commission approved the
subdivision plats in early 1979, and the Knights proceeded to plat, subdi-
vide, and sell lots. When the tribes sought to enjoin development in Septem-
ber 1977, a number of residential sites were near completion.' 16
The trial court addressed two issues: 1) whether the tribes had the au-
thority to regulate land held in fee by non-Indians within reservation bound-
aries, and, if so, 2) whether the zoning code was a proper exercise of that
power. The trial court held in favor of the tribes on both issues.
1 17
Affirming the trial court, the Tenth Circuit followed recently enun-
ciated Supreme Court principles in Mern'on v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, t 8 and
Montana v. United States,' 19 and recognized that Indians have inherent sover-
eign power over their territory and tribal members. This power allows them
to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on fee lands
within the reservation.12 0 One valid exercise of the power may be to restrict
"conduct [which] threatens or has some direct effect on the political integ-
rity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."' 2 ' In
Knight, the court determined that the tribes' interest in preservation of their
homeland,' 2 2 and the code's protective purpose, t 23 was sufficient, absent the
exercise of land use controls by other authoritative bodies, ' 24 for the tribes to
invoke their "inherent sovereign rights of self-government and territorial
management" 125 and enact the zoning ordinance. The court further recog-
nized the zoning code's purpose of preserving the rural character of the reser-
vation as a legitimate objective, commonly recognized under the police
power. In addition, the court held that the code could be enforced against
all persons whose land use activities affected tribal lands; therefore, even
non-Indians who cannot participate in tribal government could be subjected
115. Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribal Ordinance 38 applied to: "[A]II lands within the exte-
rior boundaries of the Wind River Reservation, whether held in trust by the U.S. for the benefit
of individual Indians, or for the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes, or held in fee by Indians or
non-Indians." 670 F.2d at 901.
116. Id at 902.
117. Id.
118. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
119. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
120. 670 F.2d at 902.
121. Id (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981)).
122. Among the factors cited as demonstrating significant interest in the subject land was
the proximity of traditional tribal ceremonial grounds, two major pow wow sites, two predomi-
nantly Indian schools, two Indian cemeteries, an Indian activity hall, and 241 Indian-occupied
dwellings. 670 F.2d at 903.
123. The purpose of the zoning code was expressed as follows:
Uncontrolled use and development of land within the Wind River Reservation poses a
threat to the use of the Reservation as a homeland for the Shoshone and Arapahoe
Tribes for whom the Reservation was established and jeopardizes the value of the land
and water, impairs the economic benefits of the natural resources and damages the
environment. All residents of the Reservation are affected. To protect the interests of
the Tribes and all persons on the Reservation this Code is adopted.
Id (quoting Art. 1, Tribal Zoning Code).
124. 670 F.2d at 903.
125. Id
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to the tribe's zoning authority.'
26
The Tenth Circuit's decision forecasts continued testing of the scope of
tribal authority to regulate non-Indian activities on fee lands within a reser-
vation under the principles in Montana. The Supreme Court held in Montana
that the general principles of retained inherent sovereignty, as defined in
United States v. Wheeler,' 27 apply only where the activity sought to be regu-
lated bears a clear relationship to tribal self-government or internal rela-
tions. 128 Applying this test, the Court held that the Crow Tribe of Montana
was without authority to enforce its hunting and fishing regulations against
non-Indians on fee lands within the Crow Reservation because hunting and
fishing did not bear the requisite relationship to tribal self-government or
internal relations. 129
However, the Montana Court noted that "Indian Tribes retain inherent
sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians
on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands."' 30 Thus, the Court
recognized limited sovereign control for activities that do not bear a clear
relationship to self-government and internal relations.
Among the activities a tribe may regulate under this retained inherent
power are those undertaken by non-Indians who enter into consensual rela-
tionships with the tribe or its members through commercial dealings, con-
tracts, leases, or other arrangements.' 3 ' The Court asserted such power may
be exercised over non-Indians on fee lands within a reservation when the
activity sought to be regulated "threatens or has some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe." 132 This exception to the general principle of retained inherent sover-
eignty was specifically relied on by the Tenth Circuit in upholding the au-
thority of the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes to enforce their zoning codes
against non-Indians owning land in fee within the Wind River Indian
Reservation.
Knight illustrates the potential discrepancies that may arise under the
Montana clear relationship test, and suggests that the exception to the gen-
eral principle of retained inherent sovereignty formulated by the Montana
Court may eventually dilute the test. To enforce tribal regulations over non-
Indians on fee lands, Montana requires a clear relationship to tribal self-gov-
ernment or internal relations. The Tenth Circuit circumvented this test in
Knight by finding that the tribal regulation fell within the broad exception
articulated in Montana for protection of the economic security and welfare of
126. Id at 903.
127. 435 U.S. 313 (1978). The court in Wheeler held that, in general, the ability of Indian
tribes to exercise sovereignty over the relations between the tribe and non-members has been
divested, while the inherent power of self-government in regulating the relations of members of
a tribe has been retained. Id at 326.
128. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564-65.
129. Id at 557. See Lands and Natural Resources, Eghth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 59 DEN. L.J.
335, 357 (1982).
130. 450 U.S. at 565.
131. Id




The breadth of this exception may undermine the Montana clear rela-
tionship test. For example, it is possible to imagine circumstances where
hunting and fishing activities could "so threaten the tribe's political and eco-
nomic security as to justify tribal regulation, thereby creating an exception
to the Montana holding."' 3 4 Hunting regulations might be enacted for the
purpose of preserving game whose habitat is on Indian lands within reserva-
tion boundaries but whose migratory routes cross non-Indian fee land.
Under these circumstances, the "clear relationship" test provides little gui-
dance, in light of the economic and welfare arguments that could be made in
support of regulation, and the substantial interests of tribes in preserving
reservation wildlife.
Finally, Knight's acceptance of zoning as a legitimate exercise of police
power' 35 suggests that any regulatory activity justifiable under tribal police
power may meet the welfare exception of Montana. Under the broad defini-
tion of police power, retained tribal sovereignty over non-Indian owners of
fee land within reservations will be greatly expanded.
The issue of tribal inherent sovereignty also arose in Mescalero Apache
Tribe o. New Mexi'co. 136 The question was whether a state may enforce its
game laws against non-Indians hunting and fishing on reservation land held
by the tribe. The Tenth Circuit held that where state game laws interfere
with tribal self-governance, Indian game laws prevail. Read in conjunction
with Montana's denial of Indian sovereignty over non-Indian hunting and
fishing on fee land within the reservation boundaries, Mescalero suggests that
Indian game laws prevail on reservation lands, and state laws prevail over
non-Indians on fee land.
Mescalero involved a challenge to New Mexico's attempt to enforce its
game laws within the boundaries of the Mescalero Apache Reservation. The
Tenth Circuit first considered the issue in 1980137 when the court deter-
mined that state attempts to exercise regulatory powers within an Indian
reservation are "precluded if the subject matter has been preempted by fed-
eral law or if the state regulations infringe on the Tribe's rights of self-gov-
ernment."' 138 The court, reviewing sources of tribal sovereignty and statutory
grants of power, found six sources of preemption: 1) the treaty with the
Apaches, 139 2) the Enabling Act for New Mexico, 140 3) the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act of 1934 (IRA),14 1 4) the tribal constitution and ordinances en-
133. 670 F.2d at 903.
134. 450 U.S. at 566.
135. Knikht, 670 F.2d at 903.
136. 677 F.2d 55 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 371 (1982).
137. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 630 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1980), vacated and
remanded, 450 U.S. 1036 (1981); see Lands and Natural Resources, Ehth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey,
59 DEN. L.J. 335, 353 (1982).
138. 630 F.2d at 728.
139. 10 Stat. 979 (1852).
140. Ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557 (1910) (amended 1942).
141. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976).
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acted pursuant to the IRA, 142 5) extensive federal development assistance,
and 6) the negative inferences from Public Law 280,143 under which New
Mexico had the option until 1968 of unilaterally asserting civil and criminal
jurisdiction over the Mescalero Apache Reservation, but failed to do so. The
court further determined that state attempts to enforce its game laws within
the reservation would infringe upon the tribe's significant interest in gov-
erning game within the reservation and deprive the tribe of game revenues
from its own conservation system. 144 As a result, the state was precluded
from attempting to regulate game within the boundaries of the Mescalero
Apache Reservation.
The United States Supreme Court vacated the Tenth Circuit's judg-
ment and remanded the case 145 for further consideration in light of Aontana
v. United States.146 On remand, the Tenth Circuit determined the issue to be
whether a state has the authority to regulate non-Indian hunting on Indian-
owned land within a reservation. The court distinguished Montana as involv-
ing tribal authority to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on landheld in
fee within a reservation. 14 7 The court instead relied upon the Supreme
Court's holding in Mernon v. Jicari'lla Apache Tribe 148 that an Indian tribe has
the authority to impose a severence tax on non-Indian mining activities on
reservation land as an inherent power necessary to tribal self-government
and territorial management. The Tenth Circuit then reaffirmed its earlier
finding that the tribe's management of wildlife resources on reservation
lands for economic return constituted a matter involving self-government
and internal relations, with which state game regulations would interfere.1
49
Tribes have preemptive authority to regulate non-Indian hunting and fish-
ing within reservation boundaries except for non-Indian hunting and fishing
on fee land.
B. Oil and Gas Leasees
Kenai Oil and Gas, Inc. v. Department of lnterior 15 involved the scope of the
Secretary of Interior's discretion to approve or disapprove communitization
plans for oil and gas leases from Indians within a reservation and the review-
ability of the Secretary's decision. The Tenth Circuit held that the Secretary
or his designate may refuse communitization agreements if they do not serve
the best economic interests of Indian lessors, and that this decision is subject
to judicial review. ' 5'
In 1971, Kenai Oil and Gas entered into several oil and gas leases with
142. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 630 F.2d at 731 (citing MESCALERO APACHE TRIBE REVISED
CONST., art. 11, § 1(c)).
143. Pub. L. No. 280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 28
U.S.C.).
144. 630 F.2d at 733-34.
145. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 450 U.S. 1036 (1981).
146. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
147. 677 F.2d at 56.
148. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
149. 677 F.2d at 57.
150. 671 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1982).
151. Id. at 388.
1983]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
Ute Indians on lands in the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation in Utah.
The leases, approved by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, were to expire in ten
years unless the wells on each lease were producing oil or gas in paying
quantities. Shortly before the leases expired the lessee had drilled producing
wells on only some sections of its tribal leases and had one producing well on
non-tribal land within a proposed communitized area.1 5
2  Kenai Oil and
Gas sought to include their non-producing leases on Indian land in a com-
munitized area with at least one producing well, -thereby extending the non-
productive leases beyond the primary term. The Superintendent of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, acting as the Secretary of Interior's designate, exer-
cised his discretionary authority and refused to approve the plan on the
ground it did not serve the best economic interests of the Indians.'
5 3
The district court held that the discretion authorized in the statutory
and regulatory provision rendered the Secretary and his designates immune
from judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).15 4 The
court further held that, if reviewable, the actions were not an abuse of the
Secretary's discretion, nor arbitrary or capricious.
155
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's determination that the
refusal to approve the proposed communitization plans was within the Su-
perintendent's discretion, but held his action to be subject to judicial review.
Citing Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe" 16 for preclusion of judi-
cial review only "in those rare instances where 'statutes are drawn in such
broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply,' 157 the court
recognized a presumption ofjudicial review. The court found the exercise of
the Secretary of Interior's discretion to be governed by the fiduciary respon-
sibilities vested in the United States as trustee of Indian lands.' 58 As such,
the Secretary and his designate are charged with the duty of administering
and supervising oil and gas leases on Indian lands in a manner to return a
152. As described by the court: "Under a communitization agreement, operations con-
ducted anywhere within the unit area are deemed to occur on each lease within the communi-
tized area and production anywhere within the unit is deemed to be produced from each tract
within the unit." Id at 384.
153. Communitization approval is required under 25 U.S.C. § 396(d) (1976):
All operations under any oil, gas, or other mineral lease issued pursuant to the
terms of sections 396a to 396g of this title or any other Act affecting restricted Indian
rands shall be subject to the rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the
Interior. In the discretion of the said Secretary, any lease for oil or gas issued under
the provisions of sections 396a to 396g of this title shall be made subject to the terms of
any reasonable cooperative unit or other plan approved or prescribed by said Secre-
tary prior or subsequent to the issuance of any such lease which involves the develop-
ment or production of oil or gas from land covered by such lease.
The regulations are contained in 25 C.F.R. § 211.21(b) (1982):
All such leases shall be subject to any cooperative or unit development plan af-
fecting the leased lands that may be required by the Secretary of the Interior, but no
lease shall be included in any cooperative or unit plan without prior approval of the
Secretary of the Interior and consent of the Indian tribe affected.
154. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1976). The judicial review procedures of the Act do not apply to
action committed to agency discretion by law.
155. Kenai Oil and Gas, Inc. v. Department of Interior, 522 F. Supp. 521, 535 (D. Utah
1981), a/I'd, 671 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1982).
156. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
157. Id. at 410 (quoting S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945)).
158. 671 F.2d at 386.
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profit to the Indians, and in a fiduciary capacity, to provide for the economic
interests of Indian lessors by maximizing lease revenues. S'-" The court held
that these standards of conduct provide the requisite guidelines necessary for
judicial review.
The Tenth Circuit also held that the regulatory provisions under which
communitization plan review is made are broad enough to encompass con-
siderations of the Indians' economic interests. Thus, the Superintendent ac-
ted within his discretion when he rejected the communitization plan for
higher royalty payments and bonuses. Kenai Oil and Gas had argued that
the Secretary could consider only matters involving production and conser-
vation of tribal resources, and was bound to approve those plans that fur-
thered the protection and preservation of tribal natural resources." ' ° The
court emphasized that any such limitation upon the Secretary's deliberations
would be inconsistent with his trust responsibilities, which require broad dis-
cretion to consider all factors affecting the Indians' interests.,'"
The court rejected arguments that the Superintendent's decision was
procedurally defective because he failed to base his decision on relevant fac-
tors and did not undertake additional factfinding. Noting that the Superin-
tendent had consulted with Department of Interior experts and that Kenai
Oil and Gas had presented its communitization proposal only two days prior
to expiration, the court commented that Kenai Oil and Gas could not "ex-
pect greater consultation and deliberation."
16 2
Judge Barrett, concurring, also noted the short period in which the Su-
perintendent was forced to make his decision and suggested a more favorable
result to lessee if communitization proposals were presented in a timely fash-
ion. When there is adequate time to hold hearings on the conservation-
develpment characteristics of the proposed plan, a Superintendent's refusal
to approve a communitization plan having the possibility of realizing a sub-
stantial bonus payment and increased royalty from another lessee would be
contrary to the public interest. Lessees are entitled to rely on the pooling
covenant in a lease when they have expended large sums in completing pro-
ducing wells, and the development of additional wells is feasible. Judge Bar-
rett concluded that Indian interests would be adequately protected by
implied covenants requiring lessee-operators reasonably to develop the
pooled leases and to exercise reasonable diligence in exploration and produc-




In a lengthy, detailed opinion, the Tenth Circuit concluded in Kerr-Mc-
159. Id.
160. Id at 387.
161. Id
162. Id.
163. Id. at 388-89 (Barrett, J., concurring).
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Gee Nuclear Corp. V. NRC 6 4 that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
acted within its authority in promulgating uranium mill tailing regulations
under the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978
(UMTRCA) 165 prior to the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) issu-
ance of general radiation standards. The court also concluded that the NRC
had made a reasonable showing of significant risk sufficient to sustain the
regulations.
At issue in Kerr-McGee Nuclear were the NRC's regulations establishing
standards for licensing active uranium mill tailings sites.' 66 The regulations
required mill operators to provide wind protection for tailings; to reduce
toxic material seepage into groundwater; to cover tailings with at least three
meters of earth, reducing radon emanation to a minimal level; to reduce all
airborne effluent releases to levels as low as reasonably achievable during
milling operations; and to establish surety arrangements to ensure continued
compliance with NRC requirements.' 67 Total costs imposed on existing
mills by the regulations were estimated to range from $760,000,000 to
$2,000,000,000.1 68
A health threat posed by tailings used in building materials in Grand
Junction, Colorado, had awakened the public and government agencies to
the dangers of radon produced from tailings. 169 A generic environmental
impact statement (GEIS) undertaken by the NRC in 1975 at the request of
the Natural Resource Defense Council prompted new NRC regulations
which were the predecessors to those under challenge in Kerr-McGee Nuclear.
The early regulations essentially were license conditions imposed by the
NRC, and represented a new approach to controlling uranium mill tailings
under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.170 Like the regulations under chal-
lenge, the early 1977 license conditions required mill operators to reduce
wind dispersion of tailings and seepage into groundwater, and to cover tail-
164. Nos. 80-2043, 80-229, 80-2269, 80-2271 (10th Cir. Mar. 23, 1982),reh graned, (Oct. 6,
1982).
165. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7901-7942 (Supp. IV 1980) (as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
166. 10 C.F.R. § 40 (1982). Among those challenging the regulations were Kerr-McGee
Nuclear Corp., operator of a uranium mill in New Mexico's Grants mineral belt; the American
Mining Congress, a trade association representing nearly all domestic uranium producers;
United Nuclear Corp., operator of a New Mexico mill, and partner in a Grants mineral belt
mill; Western Nuclear, Inc., operator of mills in Wyoming and Washington; Energy Fuels Nu-
clear, Inc., and Phillips Uranium Corp.
167. Id
168. Kerr-AIcGee Nuclear Corp., slip. op. at 43. NRC estimates indicated that the measures
would cost from two percent to four percent of the total uranium mill product price, or from
$760,000,000 to $1,521,000,000. Plaintiffs argued that the regulations would cost more than
7.5% of the product price because of a decline in the product price, or from $880,000,000 to
$2,000,000,000.
169. Congress appropriated funds to the state of Colorado to limit radon exposure from
tailings used in building materials. 86 Stat. 226 (1972).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1976). Under the Act, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was
responsible for regulating and licensing the use, possession, and transfer of source material, by-
product material, and special nuclear material. The NRC took over many of the AEC's func-
tions in 1974. Prior to 1978, the NRC's authority over uranium mill tailings was limited to
provisions for mill source material licensing. Because tailings did not fall within one of the three
categories of radioactive material, the NRC's control over tailings ceased upon removal from a
licensed mill or termination of a mill license. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., slip op. at 3-4.
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ings with earth to reduce radon emissions.1 7 1
NRC's regulatory scheme for uranium mill tailings was based on the
GEIS estimate that radon, emanating from uncontrolled tailings, would ac-
count for six thousand additional cancer deaths over the next one thousand
years.' 72 The National Academy of Sciences Committee on the Biological
Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR Committee) determined that although
direct experimental evidence did not show that low-dose radiation, such as
radon emissions, does or does not cause cancer, radon radiation had the po-
tential for causing cancer and genetic mutations. Recognizing that high-
dose radiation has been shown to cause cancer, the BEIR Committee hy-
pothesized that radiation exposure is harmful regardless of its dosage level.
The NRC consequently adopted the view that radiation from uranium mill
tailings should be reduced to a level as low as reasonably achievable.'
73
Plaintiffs challenged the NRC regulations on several grounds. Two sali-
ent assertions were that the NRC had usurped authority vested in the EPA,
and that the NRC had failed to find that the regulations were necessary to
address a significant risk.1
74
1. NRC Authority
Under section 206 of the UMTRCA, 175 the EPA is required to issue
standards of general application to protect the public health and safety, and
the environment from radiological and non-radiological hazards associated
with uranium mill tailings at active sites. 176 The NRC's authority also arises
from the UMTRCA. Under section 206(d), 177 the NRC is required to im-
plement and enforce the EPA standards of general applicability during its
licensing of byproduct materials.' 78 The NRC's licensing authority is set
171. Id. at 6.
172. Id.
173. Id at 5. The BEIR Committee used a linear nonthreshold hypothesis for calculating
deaths attributable to low-dose radiation. That hypothesis, adopted by the NRC, involved cal-
culating extrapolations based upon the known deaths from specific levels of high-dose radiation
and inferring downward to estimate the number of deaths attributable to specific levels of low-
dose radiation. Id.
174. Other challenges included: 1) the NRC exceeded its authority in requiring disposal of
tailings to eliminate the need for active maintenance once mills were decommissioned, 2) the
NRC denied access to and comment on nineteen reports used by the NRC to support the regu-
lations, 3) the NRC's technical criteria were arbitrary and capricious, 4) regulatory costs im-
posed on mill owners and operators failed to bear a reasonable relationship to the risks
addressed, 5) the regulations were tailored to a hypothetical "model mill," and 6) the radiation
standard, ground cover requirement, bar on groundwater degradation, and refusal to allow self-
insurance were deficient for various reasons. Id at 7-8. These challenges were addressed sum-
marily by the court and will not be reviewed here.
175. 42 U.S.C. § 2022(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
176. Congress enacted the UMTRCA in November 1978. The EPA regulations were to be
issued within eighteen months after passage of the Act. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., slip op. at 14.
177. 42 U.S.C. § 2022(d) (Supp. IV 1980).
178. Id. § 2014(e) defines "byproduct material" as:
(1) any radioactive material (except special nuclear material) yielded in or made radi-
oactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing
special nuclear material, and (2) the tailings or wastes produced by the extraction or




forth in sections 202179 and 205180 of the UMTRCA. Under section 202,
byproduct material licenses issued or renewed by the NRC must contain
site-specific terms to assure that prior to termination of the license, the licen-
see will have complied with NRC standards for uranium mill tailing sites
regarding decontamination, decommissioning, and reclamation. Under sec-
tion 205(a)(1), the NRC is charged with the general duty of ensuring that
uranium tailings are managed in a manner appropriate to protect the public
health and safety and the environment from radiological and non-radiologi-
cal hazards associated with tailings. However, section 205(a)(2)' 8 ' suggests
that the general duty imposed under section 205(a)(1) is limited by the EPA
standards of general applicability since the NRC's management of by-
product material is to be carried out in a manner that "conforms with appli-
cable general standards promulgated by the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency . ...
When the EPA failed to issue standards of general applicability within
the prescribed time, the NRC took the initiative to promulgate the regula-
tions at issue in Kerr-McGee Nuclear. Plaintiffs argued that the statutory
scheme established by section 206 of the Act required the EPA to act first.
Plaintiffs argued that section 205(a)(2) supports the scheme in section 206 by
requiring the NRC's management of uranium mill tailings sites to conform
with the standards of general applicability issued by the EPA; therefore,
Congress intended the EPA to issue its standards before the NRC tailored
site-specific standards for individual licensees. The plaintiff argued the NRC
exceeded its authority by promulgating its regulations prior to the EPA's
issuance of general standards.'8 3 Plaintiffs further supported their position
by attempting to show that historically the NRC has undertaken the licens-
ing role, while the EPA's role has been to promulgate generalized standards.
The NRC argued that its regulations were promulgated under section
202 of the Act, which grants the NRC authority to establish site-specific
standards for licensees, and under the section 205(a)(1) grant of general au-
thority to manage tailings to protect the public health and safety and the
environment.' 8 4 The NRC also noted that langauge in section 108(a) of the
Act,' 8 5 authorizing the Department of Energy to conduct remedial action at
inactive sites but not before promulgation of the EPA standards, was omitted
from those sections specifying the NRC's authority. The NRC also pointed
to legislative history in which Congress stressed the urgency of regulating
active uranium mill sites by November 1981. Congress indicated that the
NRC was to perform a distinct regulatory task in establishing its mill site
licensing standards, not a secondary role to the EPA's issuance of general
standards. Finally, the NRC argued that by waiting for the EPA to issue its
standards, the Commission would have failed to comply with the dictate of
179. Id. § 2113.
180. Id. § 2114(a)(1).
181. Id. § 2114(a)(2).
182. Id.
183. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., slip op. at 16.
184. Id at 19.
185. 42 U.S.C. § 7918 (Supp. IV 1980).
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section 205(a)(1) of the Act, that it ensure proper management of tailings. 186
The Tenth Circuit, briefly reviewing the legislative history of the
UMTRCA, concluded that Congress had been aware of the probability of
the EPA's delay in issuing general standards. Nonetheless, Congress directed
the EPA to promulgate standards for active sites within eighteen months
after enactment. The legislative history indicated Congress' intention that
the problem of active uranium mill tailing sites be addressed quickly. As a
result, the court held that the NRC was compelled to undertake its manage-
rial responsibilities under section 205(a)(1) and its licensing responsibilities
under section 202 without waiting for the EPA to act, for to delay "would
have been at odds with [the NRC's] affirmative duty. '"'8 7
In its holding, the court did not address those statutory provisions of the
UMTRCA which would act to limit the NRC's ability to promulgate tail-
ings standards until the EPA so acted. Furthermore, the court disregarded a
recent congressional enactment' 88 which prohibits the NRC from imple-
menting the challenged regulations with funds appropriated by the subse-
quent legislation.' 89 The court commented that the subsequent legislation,
accompanied by numerous expressions of congressional sentiment that the
NRC had acted too hastily in promulgating its regulations before the EPA
issued its standards, provided little weight in interpreting the intent behind
the earlier enacted UMTRCA. Thus, the court opined, "[w]here there is a
clear expression of legislative intent upon enactment, subsequent statements
by individual members of Congress or its committees are not entitled to be
given overriding significance."' 190 The court found that the UMTRCA
clearly expressed congressional intent that the NRC act before the EPA if
necessary.
The Tenth Circuit's decision is suspect in two respects: the court failed
to address the provisions of the UMTRCA that limit the NRC's authority to
the legislative history and the EPA regulatory scheme, and the dissent con-
vincingly asserted that subsequent legislation on the issue should be given
more weight.' 9' Failure to consider all of the Act's provisions is demon-
strated by the court's reliance on section 205(a)(1) as a general grant of au-
thority to manage tailings sites in a manner appropriate to protect the public
health and safety and the environment. This exclusive reliance ignores the
language of section 205(a)(2), which, contrary to the decision, appears to
186. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., slip op. at 21.
187. Id at 24.
188. Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act of 1982, 95 Stat. 1135.
189. Id at 1147 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5801):
Providedfurther, That no funds appropriated to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in
this Act may be used to implement or enforce any portion of the Uranium Mill Licens-
ing Requirements published as the final rules at 45 Federal Register 65521 to 65538 on
October 3, 1980, or to require any State to adopt such requirements in order for the
State to continue to exercise authority under State law for uranium mill and mill
tailings licensing or to exercise any regulatory authority for uranium mill and mill
tailings licensing in any State that has acted to exercise such authority under State
law.
The Act also provided, however, that appropriated funds could be used to regulate by-
product material in the manner and extent permitted prior to Oct. 3, 1980.
190. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., slip op. at 26.
191. Id (Barrett, J., dissenting).
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modify the NRC's affirmative duty by requiring conformity with the EPA
standards. This scheme is consistent with the limiting provisions of section
206(d). Although the court noted that the NRC had given its assurance that
its regulations would conform to later adopted EPA standards, 192 adminis-
trative agency agreements should be given little or no weight in determining
the scope of legislative authority.
Judge Barrett's dissent emphasized that subsequent legislation "is a
clear expression of legislative intent" 193 directed to the UMTRCA, and that
" '[s]ubsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier statute is entitled
to great weight in statutory construction.' ',194 Unlike the majority's por-
trayal of the legislative history of the subsequent legislation as expressing the
sentiments of individual congressmen, thus deserving little weight, passage of
the legislation would seem to be a clear and unified expression by Congress
as a decision-making body that the NRC had exceeded its authority.
2. Significant Risk
In the second prong of its challenge, Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp. as-
serted that the NRC had failed to make a finding of significant risk to justify
its regulations. Plaintiffs argued that under Industrial Union Department v.
American Petroleum Institute,' 95 the NRC could impose its regulations only
upon a finding of the necessity to address a significant risk; the Atomic En-
ergy Act does not permit the NRC to address all conceivable risks. 196
Industrial Union Department involved regulations promulgated by the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) that reduced the per-
missible exposure limit to benzene, a common industrial solvent having a
causal connection to cancer, from the standard of ten parts per million to
one part per million. The regulations were promulgated pursuant to
OSHA's authority to protect workers from toxic materials. 19 7 Like the regu-
lations in Kerr-McGee Nuclear, the OSHA regulations were not based on
specific findings that low doses of benzene were carcinogenic. OSHA had
promulgated its low-level exposure standards on the assumption that absent
definite proof of a safe level, "any level above zero presents some increased
risk of cancer."' 9 The Supreme Court, however, interpreted the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970'99 as requiring a showing of significant




194. Id (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1969)).
195. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
196. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., slip op. at 8.
197. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976):
The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful
physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately
assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no em-
ployee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such
employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the pe-
riod of his working life . ...
198. 448 U.S. at 635-36 (emphasis in original).
199. 29 US.C. § 651 (1976).
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In so holding, the Court relied on the Act's definition of standard as
requiring practices "reasonably necessary" for health and safety. 200 The
Supreme Court then applied the significant-risk-of-harm test to determine if
the regulations were reasonably necessary. 20' A finding of significant harm
must be supported by substantial evidence.
20 2
In Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp. the Tenth Circuit concluded that the signifi-
cant risk doctrine is confined to OSHA, or at least to those statutes contain-
ing language of the "reasonably necessary" nature found within the Act; the
doctrine does not apply to the UMTRCA. 20 3 The court also concluded that
the UMTRCA's legislative history regarding significant hazards to the pub-
lic by uranium mill tailings appears "tantamount to a Congressional deter-
mination of 'significant risk' and thus may obviate the need for an
equivalent determination by the NRC."'20 4 The court further held that the
NRC findings as to the risks posed by uranium mill tailings probably would
satisfy the significant risk requirement if it were applicable. 20 5
The determination of a significant risk of harm involves a two-step pro-
cess. First, the agency establishes a specific level of risk of harm as being
significant. The level need only be a reasonable one, or between one in one
thousand and one in one billion. 20 6 Second, the agency determines whether
the risk posed by the conduct to be regulated exceeds that level. Those find-
ings are subject to the "substantial evidence" or "arbitrary and capricious"
standard of review. 20 7 The court held that the NRC probably met the signif-
icant risk test upon its findings that radon released from uncontrolled ura-
nium tailings piles would cause about one additional cancer death in fifty
million, or 5.4 deaths, and one genetic defect in one hundred fifty million, or
two genetic defects, in the United States each year between 1979 and the
year 3000, based upon an estimated population of 293 million. 20 8 Although
the court characterized the risks as seemingly small,20 9 other characteristics




Glover River Organizations v. Department of Interior 2 "t presented the Tenth
200. Id. § 652(8) provides: "The term 'occupational safety and health standard' means a
standard which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means,
methods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or health-
ful employment and places of employment."
201. 448 U.S. at 641.
202. Id at 652-53.
203. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., slip op. at 30.
204. Id at 31.
205. Id. at 32.
206. Id.
207. Id at 35.
208. Id. at 33-34.
209. Natural background radiation may pose a one in twenty thousand risk of cancer. Id at
34.
210. Among the associated hazards contributing to tailings risks are the higher risks faced
by those living near tailings piles and chemical and heavy metal seepage into groundwater. Id
211. 675 F.2d 251 (10th Cir. 1982).
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Circuit with a challenge to the Secretary of Interior's failure to prepare an
environmental impact statement (EIS) pursuant to the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA)21 2 before listing the leopard darter as a
threatened species and designating its critical habitat under the Endangered
Species Act. 21 3 The challenge was brought by the Glover River Organiza-
tion, a nonprofit Oklahoma corporation devoted to promoting flood control
projects in the Little River Basin of southeastern Oklahoma. Plaintiffs ar-
gued that prior to the government's designations, an EIS should have been
prepared to determine the impact of such action on federal funding for flood
control projects and other federal industry and farm programs in southeast-
ern Oklahoma. 2 14 The organization alleged that the listing would eliminate
appropriations for dams and soil conservation watershed projects for flood
prevention along the Glover Creek and Little River. Many of the organiza-
tion's members had been victims of severe flood damage.
2t 5
The Tenth Circuit applied a two-step test to determine Glover River's
standing. A plaintiff must allege that he has sustained " 'a distinct and pal-
pable injury to himself,' " and that " 'the asserted injury was the conse-
quence of the defendants' actions, or that prospective relief will remove the
harm.' ",216 Applying this test, the court concluded that the first step of the
test was satisfied by plaintiff's allegation of future flooding if dams were not
built. The injury was concrete, not simply speculative or hypothetical.
However, the court held that the second part of the test could be met only by
a substantial showing that the relief requested would redress the injury
claimed. The organization failed to demonstrate by a substantial showing
that a causal link existed between the listing of the leopard darter and the
loss of federal funding to build dams. The court summarized: "Even if the
preparation of an EIS should lead to removal of the leopard darter from the
threatened species list, this would not ensure the funding or construction of
the projects Glover desires. Such relief must come from Congress and the
President, not the Secretary of the Interior. ' ' 21 7 The organization failed to
establish standing.
The challenge in Glover River Organization is certain to provoke reap-
praisals of the scope of NEPA and the future role of the EIS. In essence,
plaintiffs in Glover River Organization employed a "reverse" EIS strategy. Tra-
ditionally, the EIS is used to delay dam construction by demonstrating in-
jury to endangered species and critical habitat. In this case an EIS was
sought to prevent impediment to dam construction by showing injury to
landowners. If future plaintiffs overcome the standing hurdle, the tactic em-
ployed in Clover River Organization may become a popular means of coun-
tering similar delaying strategies used by environmentalists.
212. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
213. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
214. 675 F.2d at 253.
215. Id. at 254.
216. Id. at 253 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 505 (1975)).
217. 675 F.2d at 255.
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VI. WATER LAW
A. Dredge-and-Fill Pennits
Conditions imposed on a nationwide dredge-and-fill permit under sec-
tion 404 of the Clean Water Act 2 18 occasioned a challenge to the Army
Corps of Engineers' authority to control water releases from a dam in River-
side Ir'gation District v. Stipo. 21 9 Riverside Irrigation District and the Public
Service Company of Colorado (PSC) were engaged in a joint project to con-
struct a dam and reservoir on Wildcat Creek, a tributary of the South Platte
River in Colorado. The reservoir water, acquired under state law, was to be
used for irrigation and as a coolant for a coal-fired power plant. Construc-
tion was to proceed under a nationwide dredge-and-fill permit, which autho-
rizes the discharge of dredged or fill material, causing minimal adverse effect
on the environment, into certain waters of the United States.2 20 A nation-
wide permit is automatic for those who qualify; therefore, no individual ap-
plication is necessary for qualified applicants.
After examining the potential impact of the project, the Fish and Wild-
life Service determined that operation of Wildcat Reservoir would likely
jeopardize the existence of the whooping crane, an endangered species, and
adversely modify a fifty-three mile stretch of the crane's critical habitat 300
miles downstream, on the Platte River. 22' The Corps of Engineers notified
Riverside Irrigation District and PSC that the project would not qualify for
a nationwide permit unless steps were taken to mitigate its impact on the
whooping crane and its habitat. Mitigating measures included either replac-
ing the amount of water consumed by Wildcat Reservoir or improving the
whooping crane's habitat along the Platte River in Nebraska.222 Both meas-
ures required a modification of water releases from the reservoir. Failure to
comply with the measures would require Riverside Irrigation District and
218. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
219. 658 F.2d 762 (10th Cir. 1981).
220. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
221. 658 F.2d at 764.
222. Id at 766. The alternatives were listed by the Fish and Wildlife Service Regional
Director as follows:
The first alternative is for the Corps to condition the Section 404 permit to require
replacement of the additional consumptive use due to the Wildcat Resevoir. Replace-
ment must be done in a manner that closely approximates the flow that would occur if
the reservoir were not constructed. It would be beneficial if the applicant were to
obtain and release this water from a source closer to the critical habitat than the Wild-
cat Reservoir, thereby making the water less vulnerable to diversion upstream from
this habitat; however, this would be left to the applicant's discretion. The volume to
be released might be reduced and the timing altered after conclusion of Department of
Interior studies of the Platte River system ....
The second alternative is for the Corps to require the applicant to improve or
maintain whooping crane habitat along the Platte River. This alternative probably
would include water releases (of a lesser volume than the reservoir would deplete)
combined with land acquisition and habitat manipulation and management. Exam-
ples of habitat practices include clearing and leveling of islands, burning or spraying
of vegetation, and flow regulation designed to increase scouring.
Id (quoting letter from Donald W. Minnich, Regional Director of the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service, to Col. D.V. Stipo, District Engineer of the United States Army Corp of Engi-
neers (Dec. 20, 1979)).
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PSC to seek an individual permit, with a full public interest review.
2 23
Riverside Irrigation District and PSC challenged the Corps of Engi-
neers' exercise of authority in district court, asserting that they were entitled
to a nationwide permit and were not required to comply with the mitigation
measures or seek an individual permit. The Corps responded with a motion
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to exhaust administrative reme-
dies.224 The Corps sought to require the irrigation district and PSC to begin
administrative proceedings to seek an individual permit before testing the
nationwide permit issue in court.225 The district court upheld jurisdiction to
review the Corps' action.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit considered whether the construction per-
mit issue could be tested in a judicial rather than an administrative proceed-
ing. The court concluded that jurisdiction was proper for two reasons. First,
the court noted that the Corps had clearly decided that plaintiffs did not
qualify for a nationwide permit.226 Thus, the official action represented a
final determination on the matter, thereby subjecting the action to judicial
review. Second, the court determined that for plaintiffs to proceed with con-
struction and potentially incur severe criminal and civil penalties was an
unrealistic course of action.22 7 Therefore, plaintiffs were entitled to judicial
review in their search of a remedy.
The Tenth Circuit then narrowed the issue to whether the Corps of
Engineers had exceeded its statutory authority in requiring compliance with
mitigating measures that modified reservoir releases prior to issuing a nation-
wide dredge-and-fill permit. Although the court remanded the issue for de-
termination, it noted that "[n]o one in these proceedings asserts that the
construction work on the dam nor the placement of fill material will in any way
affect the crane habitat. ' ' 22 8 An assessment of the impact of the Wildcat
project on whooping cranes and their habitat was made by the Corps of
Engineers and the Fish and Wildlife Service. The court noted that the agen-
cies' concerns focused on the operation of the Wildcat Reservoir after con-
struction. Thus, the court concluded that the issue was whether the Corps of
Engineers may, pursuant to its authority to issue dredge-and-fill permits, im-
pose conditions on the operational phase of the dam.
229
The resolution of this question on remand will influence the degree of
control that may be exercised pursuant to section 404 of the Clean Water
Act over water rights acquired under state law. Storage rightholders, now
subject to state in-stream flow maintenance restrictions could become subject
to further flow restrictions imposed by the Corps of Engineers. Furthermore,
the Corps' modifications of stream flow conditions could encompass purposes
other than the state's maintenance of priority water rights.
223. 658 F.2d at 766. See 33 C.F.R. § 325 (1981).
224. 658 F.2d at 764.
225. Id at 765.
226. Id at 767.
227. Id.
228. Id (emphasis in original).
229. Id at 768.
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B. Beneficial Use
InJicart'la Apache Tribe v. United States ,230 the Tenth Circuit considered
the validity of an agreement between the Water and Resources Services (for-
merly the Bureau of Reclamation) and the city of Albuquerque. The agree-
ment granted the city permission to store its share of the San Juan-Chama
Project water in Elephant Butte Reservoir. 23 ' The issue was whether the
proposed uses for the stored water constituted a beneficial use under New
Mexico's permit system of prior appropriation. The uses proposed by the
city included present sales to beneficial users, exchanges with other beneficial
users, power generation, municipal use, and recreation.
232
The city contracted for 48,200 acre feet of water per year beginning in
1982. As a result, the city was obligated to repay the federal government its
portion of project construction costs attributable to the city's water supply,
plus interest, and annual operation and maintenance charges. Payment was
required whether or not the city used its allocated water supply. To offset its
costs, Albuquerque sought to put its supply to immediate use even though
the city will not need its full allocation until the year 2025. By that date the
difference between its needs and its accumulated water allocation would to-
tal an estimated 1,121,900 acre feet. It is this "excess" water the city sought
to store and place in use. If the excess water were stored for forty years until
full use by the city, ninety-three percent of the water would be lost to
evaporation.
233
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the city's plans to sell a portion of its water
for present beneficial use and to exchange a portion for other water at a
future time. The court regarded both uses as too speculative to qualify as a
beneficial use because no showing of specific sale or exchange agreements
had been made; a mere hope of sales in the future is not sufficient to estab-
lish a beneficial use. 234 Albuquerque's plans to use the stored water to gen-
erate additional power were also speculative because the city lacked firm
commitments from buyers. 235 Thus, while the court recognized resale, ex-
change, and power generation as beneficial uses under state law, the applica-
tion of the stored water to those uses was too remote or speculative to
constitute a beneficial use.
2 36
The Tenth Circuit then turned its attention to whether recreational use
qualifies as a beneficial use under state or federal law. The court, finding the
issue had not been resolved under state law,23 7 concluded that federal law
230. 657 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1981).
231. Id at 1132-33. The San Juan-Chama Project diverts water from the Navajo River in
Colorado to Elephant Butte Reservoir in New Mexico, about 150 miles downstream from Albu-
querque on the Rio Grande. The project was authorized in 1966 to meet the needs of Albu-
querque and Rio Grande Valley irrigation for "municipal, domestic and industrial uses, and for
providing recreation and fish and wildlife benefits." 43 U.S.C. § 615 (1976).
232. 657 F.2d at 1133.
233. Id Of the 1,121,900 acre feet of water claimed by the city, only 78,811 acre feet would
remain as a result of evaporation during storage. Id. at 1134.
234. Id at 1135.
235. Id at 1136.
236. Id at 1137-38.
237. Id at 1136.
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prohibits water storage for solely recreational purposes. Relying on the au-
thorizing legislation and contemporaneous history of the San Juan-Chama
Project, 238 the court ruled that while recreation and wildlife were among
those activities and resources to be benefited by the project, they constituted
merely incidental uses. Congress intended that water storage serve the pri-
mary purposes of municipal, domestic, and industrial uses in order to qualify
as a beneficial use.
2 39
Ronald L. Wilcox
238. 43 U.S.C. § 615 (1976).
239. 657 F.2d at 1145.
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